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6 Towards a differentiated products theory of 
copyright 




The economic analysis of copyright is largely founded on the premise that consumption 
of copyrighted works is nonrivalrous, a premise that distinguishes markets for intellectual 
property from markets for other types of goods. In the context of copyright, this is 
generally taken to mean that the marginal cost associated with the consumption of an 
incremental unit of a copyrighted work is effectively zero. Nonrivalry in turn gives rise to 
a well-known economic conundrum. If authors are to break even, the prices they charge 
must defray the fixed cost needed to produce the work in the first place (often called 
‘first-copy costs’) as well as cover the marginal cost associated with producing an 
incremental unit. However, pricing above marginal cost necessarily reduces welfare by 
excluding some potential users from consuming the work even though the benefits they 
would derive exceed the costs of permitting them to do so. This has led scholars to frame 
copyright in terms of the need to balance two opposing considerations. On the one hand 
are the benefits flowing from the efficient dissemination of copyrighted works (often 
referred to as the ‘access’ side of the tradeoff). On the other hand is the need to provide 
authors with sufficient compensation to support the creation of their works (often called 
the ‘incentives’ side of the tradeoff) (Novos & Waldman, 1984; Johnson, 1985; 
Liebowitz, 1985; Landes & Posner, 1989). This tradeoff implicitly posits that markets for 
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copyrighted works are protected by entry barriers and that particular works do not face 
substantial competition from substitutes. 
 The traditional economic approach to copyright assumes that copyright turns 
authors into monopolists over their works (Novos & Waldman, 1984; Liebowitz, 1985). 
The power over price conveyed by this legal monopoly power gives rise to the familiar 
efficiency losses that occur whenever prices exceed marginal cost. The concomitant 
transfer of surplus from consumers to producers has also led some scholars to raise 
distributional concerns (Netanel, 1996; Boyle, 2000; Cohen, 2000). Together these 
considerations have led to the emergence of a consensus that copyright protection is a 
necessary evil and that Congress and the courts should calibrate copyright protection to 
the lowest level that still provides sufficient return to support creation of the work. 
 The problem with the traditional approach is that copyrighted works do in fact 
face competition from other works that serve as imperfect substitutes and that entry is 
often quite easy. In fact, the doctrine known as the ‘idea-expression dichotomy,’ which 
limits copyright protection only to those aspects of a work that display the author’s 
originality and leaves unprotected any facts or ideas contained within the work (17 
U.S.C. § 102(b)), has the practical effect of guaranteeing that any competitor willing to 
undertake the same fixed cost investment as the original author remains free to create 
alternative works with the same functional characteristics.  
 The growing recognition that copyrighted works generally face some degree of 
competition from other works has led some scholars to turn to dominant firm and 
Cournot market structures to model markets for copyrighted works (Landes & Posner, 
1989; Koboldt, 1995; Watt, 2000). Although an improvement over the monopoly 
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approach, these models still fail to capture the full dynamics of entry. Other scholars have 
drawn on the approach to imperfect competition best suited to capturing the key 
characteristics of markets for copyrighted works; the theory of product differentiation. 
Early analyses focused solely on product differentiation in the limited context of direct 
copying, in which unauthorized copies serve as imperfect substitutes for the original 
(Johnson, 1985; Liebowitz, 1985; Besen & Kirby, 1989; Koboldt, 1995).2 While helpful, 
these models still fail to capture the economic impact of free entry by similar works. 
Some initial work applying differentiated product models to model competition between 
different works has begun to appear (Lunney, 1996; Abramowicz, 2004). Previous efforts 
have stopped short of considering the full range of normative and remedial implications. 
 This chapter offers a more complete exploration of the economic insights 
provided by a shift to a differentiated products approach to copyright (see also Yoo, 
2004). Adoption of a differentiated products approach opens up the policy space by 
revealing that access to creative works can be increased by facilitating entry by new 
works and allowing the ensuing competition to reduce the spread between price and 
marginal cost. At the same time, the possibility of entry largely alleviates any concerns 
about overstimulation of creative activity or sustainable profits generally associated with 
the incentives side of the tradeoff. It suggests that over the long run the presence of 
supracompetitive profits will only serve to stimulate entry which improves access via 
lower prices and increased product variety.  
 Perhaps most importantly, the differentiated products approach suggests that the 
degree of tension between access and incentives implied by the traditional approach may 
be overstated. By demonstrating how facilitating entry can essentially promote both 
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considerations simultaneously, the differentiated products approach echoes one of the 
central insights of classic property theory, which emphasizes how well-defined property 
rights can promote economic efficiency (Demsetz, 1967; Hardin, 1968). Indeed, it shows 
how access to copyrighted works can be served by strengthening property rights, which 
would stimulate entry and drive price closer to marginal cost as well as increase product 
variety.3 
 In contrast to the traditional approach, the differentiated products approach also 
provides a basis for distinguishing among the available policy instruments. Previous 
models tended to represent the overall level of copyright protection with a single variable 
(Novos & Waldman, 1984; Landes & Posner, 1989; Koboldt, 1995). Viewing copyright 
through the lens of product differentiation makes it possible to isolate the impact of 
multiple ways in which copyright protection can be strengthened or weakened. 
 What results is a reconceptualization of copyright that moves beyond the 
relatively static vision of monopoly economics and captures the dynamics of free entry. 
The differentiated products approach also accords better with the institutional capabilities 
of governmental actors. By providing a decentralized, market-oriented means for 
ensuring that authors capture only enough revenue to cover their fixed costs and no more, 
it responds to the growing doubts that courts and legislatures are institutionally capable of 
striking the proper balance between access and incentives. The government is better 
suited to promoting access by strengthening copyright protection than to attempting to 
strike the proper balance between access and incentives through the careful calibration of 
the level of copyright protection. 
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6.2 The normative implications of the differentiated products 
approach 
 
The normative insights provided by applying the differentiated products approach to 
copyright can most easily be understood in terms of the theory of monopolistic 
competition pioneered by Chamberlin (1933). Monopolistic competition retains most of 
the assumptions underlying perfect competition, including free entry and the presence of 
a sufficient number of buyers and sellers to justify ignoring strategic reactions to pricing 
decisions. The key difference is that monopolistic competition relaxes the assumption 
that competing works are homogeneous. Instead, product differentiation gives authors a 
sufficient degree of power over price to justify modeling each work as facing a 
downward-sloping demand curve. Because each author makes his or her own 
independent price and quantity decisions, this approach models competition at the 
producer level rather than at the industry level. When the market is analyzed at the 
producer level rather than the industry level, total surplus depends not only on the amount 
of surplus generated in any particular work, but also on the total number of works 
created.  
 The market power conveyed by product differentiation leads producers of 
differentiated works to set short-run prices in precisely the same manner as a monopolist, 
which results in deadweight loss and short-run supracompetitive profits. However, the 
possibility of entry recognized by monopolistic competition dictates that the short-run 
equilibrium is unstable. When entry is free, the presence of supracompetitive profits 
attracts entry by authors offering similar works. The classic Chamberlinian formulation 
of monopolistic competition also assumes that consumers’ preferences are symmetric 
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with respect to a cluster of other works.4 The primary effect of this assumption is to place 
each work in equal competition with all other works in the group rather than in localized 
competition with a smaller set of near neighbors. Because all of the works in the market 
are in equal competition with one another, new entrants take business equally from each 
of the incumbents, which causes the demand curve confronting each incumbent work to 
shift inward. In addition, the demand curve confronting each author becomes more elastic 
as a growing number of new works increases the number of imperfect substitutes 
available for each consumer. 
 Entry will continue until no economic profits remain, which, under Chamberlin’s 
original formulation, will occur when the surplus appropriated by each author is just 
enough to cover fixed costs5. The equilibrium number of works is determined by the size 
of the market relative to the size of fixed costs. Indeed, as the size of the market expands 
or the size of the fixed costs declines, the number of works asymptotically approaches 
infinity, and the deadweight loss approaches zero (Hart 1979; Mankiw & Whinston, 
1986; Jones, 1987; Eaton & Lipsey, 1989).6 
 
 A new perspective on access 
 
The shift to a differentiated products approach effects two significant changes to the 
economic analysis of copyright. First, when products are homogeneous, authors can 
compete only on a single dimension—price—which also greatly simplifies the welfare 
analysis by reducing it to total surplus. When the competing works are differentiated, the 
value of product diversity must also be taken into account, making simple price-cost 
margins incomplete indicators of economic efficiency. As a result, product differentiation 
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raises the possibility that any deadweight losses caused by nonmarginal cost pricing 
might be offset in part by welfare gains resulting from product variety.  
 Even more importantly, the differentiated products approach highlights the 
existence of an alternative way to reduce deadweight loss that up until now has largely 
been overlooked. Specifically, it illustrates how access can be promoted not by lowering 
the degree of protection provided by copyright, but rather by facilitating entry by similar 
works. Entry by near substitutes causes the demand curve facing each work to become 
more elastic, which in turn reduces the spread between price and marginal cost.7 
 In this manner, the differentiated products approach opens up the policy space by 
identifying how entry can promote access, an insight that the traditional approach is 
poorly situated to take into account. When nonrivalrous goods are homogeneous, entry is 
unnecessarily duplicative and simply wastes resources. Moreover, the tendency towards 
natural monopoly created by declining-cost structures strongly suggests that no such 
entry would be viable. 
 This analysis suggests that access may be promoted by strengthening copyright 
protection, because it is the presence of profits that stimulates entry8 (although, per the 
subsequent discussion, the analysis may require weakening other aspects of copyright 
protection). This stands in stark contrast to the traditional approach to promoting access, 
which focuses solely on lowering the level of copyright protection. Indeed, the 
differentiated products approach suggests that weakening copyright will only serve to 
deter entry by reducing the revenue generated by each work. Consequently, as will be 
discussed in greater detail alter, it may have the perverse effect of cementing an 
excessively concentrated market structure into place. 
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 The differentiated products approach also mitigates any distributional concerns 
raised by increasing the amount of surplus captured by authors. As noted earlier, entry 
will continue until any supracompetitive profits are largely dissipated. Furthermore, any 
short-run transfer of surplus from consumers to producers will largely accrue to 
consumers’ benefit over the long run in the form of increased product variety.  
 The foregoing discussion demonstrates how the differentiated products approach 
opens up the policy space by revealing how access can be promoted indirectly by 
stimulating entry rather than directly by lowering the level of copyright protection. In the 
process, it reveals that under certain circumstances, economic welfare might better be 
promoted by following precisely the opposite of the policies prescribed under the 
traditional approach to the economics of copyright. 
 
 The formalization of optimal incentives 
 
 Appropriability as a determinant of optimal incentives 
 
In addition to suggesting an alternative way to promote access, the differentiated products 
approach also offers a solution to one of the fundamental limitations of the traditional 
approach, which is its inability to provide a basis for formalizing the optimal level of 
incentives. In the absence of such a basis, scholars have employed rough metrics to 
approximate the proper balance (Fisher, 1998; Brennan, 2002). These scholars concede 
that such metrics provide only a vague sense of how much creative activity would be 
optimal. 
 The present analysis overcomes this shortcoming by offering a basis for 
determining the optimal level of entry. It suggests that a work should be produced 
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whenever the surplus it would create exceeds the costs needed to produce it. This 
condition is met whenever the total surplus generated by the work is larger than the fixed 
cost (Spence 1976a, 1976b; Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977; Spence & Owen, 1977; Koenker & 
Perry, 1981). 
 This criterion for determining efficient levels of entry illustrates the importance of 
the authors’ ability to appropriate the surplus generated from their works. It suggests that 
a reduction in authors’ ability to appropriate the surplus created by their works can cause 
them to forego creating marginal works even though doing so would cause total welfare 
to increase. The larger the reduction in the authors’ ability appropriate surplus, the fewer 
welfare-enhancing works will be created. 
 This represents a fairly sharp departure from the view of appropriability taken by 
the traditional approach, which takes the position that copyright law should carefully 
calibrate appropriability so that works capture only enough surplus to support creation of 
the work. The differentiated products approach reveals that such fine tuning would be 
counterproductive, since any limitations to authors’ ability to appropriate surplus will 
cause a suboptimal number of works to be created and entry by competitive works will 
help ensure that no work garners excessive returns.9 As a result, increasing 
appropriability lacks distributional implications over the long run, since free entry will 
dissipate any profits initially accrued and largely cause them to accrue back to consumers 
in the form of increased product variety. At the same time, doctrines that restrict 
appropriability have the inevitable effect of exacerbating the access side of the tradeoff 
by decreasing the extent to which entry can narrow the spread between price and 
marginal cost. Indeed, the foregoing analysis demonstrates how lowering the level of 
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copyright protection, rather than promoting efficiency, may have the perverse effect of 
entrenching a concentrated market structure into place by making it impossible for new 
competitors to enter. 
 
 Demand diversion as a countervailing consideration 
 
The analysis advanced thus far would appear to suggest that economic welfare would 
best be promoted by maximizing authors’ ability to appropriate surplus. Indeed, were 
appropriability the only relevant consideration, copyright policy would devolve into a 
simple matter of allowing authors to capture as much revenue as possible. However, 
complete appropriation of surplus, which would require perfect price discrimination, is a 
practical impossibility. One would thus conclude that markets would exhibit a systematic 
tendency towards underproduction of copyrighted works that could not be rectified no 
matter how much copyright law is structured to enhance appropriability.  
 One countervailing consideration, however, is whether the sales captured by a 
new entrant represent incremental sales to new customers or instead represent sales 
cannibalized from authors already in the market. Following Borenstein (1985), the former 
effect will be referred to as ‘demand creation’ and the latter effect as ‘demand 
diversion.’10 
 The possibility of demand diversion allows markets to create the optimal number 
of works even when authors are unable to appropriate the entirety of the surplus created 
by their works. As stated earlier, the basic welfare criterion for evaluating the efficiency 
of entry offered by the differentiated products approach dictates that a work be produced 
whenever the benefits it creates exceed the costs required to produce it. Although no 
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author is able to appropriate the entire surplus created by his or her work, demand 
diversion raises the possibility that the incremental surplus that an author is unable to 
capture might be replaced by surplus cannibalized from other incumbents. In other words, 
because of demand diversion, the fact that perfect price discrimination is impossible need 
not lead to a systematic underproduction of product variety.  
 In fact, demand diversion creates the possibility of excess entry, in which authors 
produce new works even when the costs of doing so exceed the benefits. As noted earlier, 
efficient entry requires that authors produce new works only when the surplus attributable 
to demand creation exceeds the fixed costs needed to produce the work. The problem is 
that a profit-maximizing author will enter whenever the total surplus it captures exceeds 
the fixed costs of entry regardless of whether the surplus captured results from demand 
creation or demand diversion. Such an author could finance the fixed costs with surplus 
cannibalized from other producers already in the market rather than incremental surplus 
generated by new consumers. Under these circumstances, the profitability constraint does 
not necessarily prevent the waste of resources. In such cases, it may be appropriate to use 
copyright to restrict entry by increasing the degree of differentiation required before a 
new work does not infringe on existing works. 
 
6.3 The remedial implications of the differentiated products 
approach 
 
In contrast to the traditional approach, the differentiated products approach also provides 
a basis for distinguishing among the available policy instruments. As noted earlier, 
previous models tended to represent the overall level of copyright protection with a single 
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variable. Only a handful of copyright scholars have offered some preliminary attempts to 
analyze the interaction among limited aspects of copyright protection (Fisher, 1998, Liu, 
2002; Hughes, 2003). 
 Product differentiation theory provides a basis for modeling the impact of 
different aspects of copyright protection, as illustrated by the patent literature using 
spatial competition to analyze the tradeoff between a patent’s ‘length,’ determined by the 
duration of the patent term, and its ‘breadth,’ which is most usefully described for present 
purposes as how close a competing product may come in the characteristics space to a 
patented product without constituting infringement (Klemperer, 1990). 
 The differentiated products approach to copyright suggests a similar analysis, but 
with some important modifications. Specifically, it suggests that the analysis might be 
enriched by disaggregating the concept of length into two distinct concepts. On the one 
hand is what I will call the ‘size’ of the right, as determined by the number of surplus-
generating activities contained within the right. On the other hand is what might be called 
the ‘intensity’ of the right, as determined by the author’s ability to capture the available 
surplus. An increase in the size of the right would be represented by an outward shift of 
the demand curve. An increase in the intensity of the right would be represented by an 
increase in the proportion of the available surplus captured by authors rather than 
consumers, created for example by a change in law that facilitates price discrimination.  
 Expanding the analysis in this manner highlights the complex interactions among 
these factors. Interestingly, the policy implications do not all point in the same direction. 
Specifically, the differentiated products approach indicates that the best way to render a 
market more competitive is by increasing the number of surplus-generating activities 
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encompassed by the right, facilitating authors’ ability to appropriate surplus, and by 
liberalizing how close competing products can come without constituting infringement. 
In other words, economic welfare would best be promoted by a copyright that is large and 
intense, but narrow. The differentiated products approach is therefore not an unqualified 
endorsement for strengthening copyright protection. Instead, by providing a basis for 
distinguishing among different aspects of copyright protection, it allows for a more 
nuanced approach to copyright policy.  
 
 Determinants of the differentiated products equilibrium 
 
 The size of the right 
 
An important determinant of the overall competitiveness of markets for copyrighted 
works is the size of the copyright, as determined by the number of surplus-generating 
activities encompassed within its scope. As noted earlier, the overall competitiveness 
among differentiated products is determined by the level of entry, which is in turn 
determined by the magnitude of the relevant market relative to the fixed costs of entry. 
Increasing the ratio of the size of the overall market to fixed costs brings the resulting 
equilibrium closer to the competitive outcome. 
 The primary means for policymakers to increase this ratio is to expand the size of 
the copyright by increasing the number of surplus-generating activities that fall within the 
scope of each copyrighted work. One determinant of the size of the right that has received 
a great deal of attention in recent months is the lengthening of the copyright term effected 
by the Copyright Term Extension Act. But other examples abound, such as the extent to 
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which copyright allows authors to retain performance rights. Doing so has the effect of 
causing the demand curve confronting each copyrighted work to shift outwards. 
 The differentiated products approach suggests that increasing the size of the right 
can promote both access and incentives by increasing the equilibrium number of works. 
The suggestion that access would be promoted best by raising rather than lowering the 
level of copyright protection may seem counterintuitive. After all, it implies that the 
proper policy response to markets that are too concentrated is to increase the degree of 
copyright protection that authors enjoy. This apparent contradiction disappears when 
viewed in light of the traditional approach’s inability to capture the dynamics of entry. So 
long as entry is free, any strengthening in the level of copyright protection will not 
ultimately accrue to the benefit of the incumbents. Instead, it will only attract more entry, 
which will in turn reduce deadweight loss and bring the number of works closer to the 
optimum. Any short-term profits made possible by the expansion of the size of the right 
will largely accrue back to consumers in the form of increased variety. 
 
 The intensity of the right 
 
Another consideration that determines the market’s ability to promote economic welfare 
is the intensity of the right, which is determined by authors’ ability to appropriate surplus. 
Unlike increases in the size of a copyright, which cause the demand curve confronting a 
copyrighted work to shift outwards, increases in intensity leave the demand curve intact 
and simply increase the proportion of the area under the demand curve captured by 
authors. Intensity is affected by copyright principles such as the first sale doctrine, which 
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limits authors’ ability to engage in price discrimination. Authors’ ability to appropriate 
surplus is also shaped by the breadth of the fair use doctrine.  
 As noted earlier, any reduction in appropriability tends to reduce the equilibrium 
number of works. Such a reduction can harm the incentives side of the tradeoff by 
causing the total number of works produced to drop below optimal levels. It also harms 
the access side of the tradeoff by limiting the extent to which entry by new works will 
reduce deadweight loss. 
 This suggests that increasing authors’ ability to capture the surplus created by 
their works can promote both the access and the incentives side of the copyright tradeoff. 
Again, this argument may seem counterintuitive from the standpoint of the traditional 
approach to copyright, which views access and incentives as being in inexorable tension. 
The solution lies in understanding that access may be promoted as much by increasing 
the number of works available for consumption as by mandating access to the limited 
number of works that have already been created. 
 
 The breadth of the right 
 
Finally, the extent to which consumers regard competing works as substitutes plays a 
natural role in determining how many firms will enter at equilibrium and how robust the 
competition among those firms will be. Copyright’s breadth is a legal constraint on 
substitution because infringing works cannot compete absent permission from the 
copyright holder. This analysis then initially suggests that copyright should be kept 
narrow in order to promote lower price-cost margins. 
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 There are, however, considerations that cut in the other direction. For example, 
substitutability also determines the extent to which the surplus captured by any particular 
work derives from demand diversion. The higher the degree of substitutability between 
the works, the greater the proportion of the total surplus captured that demand diversion 
will represent. In other words, the more closely related works can be without constituting 
infringement, the greater the amount of surplus will come from demand diversion.  
 As noted earlier, demand diversion plays a critical role in determining how 
closely the total number of works produced will approximate the optimum. Up to a point, 
demand diversion is beneficial, as it can replace the surplus that authors are unable to 
appropriate because of their imperfect ability to price discriminate. Beyond that point, 
demand diversion creates the possibility of excess entry. The danger of excess entry is the 
greatest when goods are the most substitutable. 
 Policy makers may reduce the impact of demand diversion by using the standard 
of copyright infringement to reduce the substitutability between competing works. Doing 
so would require a delicate balance. On the one hand, reducing substitutability limits the 
impact of demand diversion and thus brings the number of works closer to optimal levels. 
On the other hand, reducing substitutability also reduces the extent to which price-cost 
margins are narrowed by entry. Policy makers charged with calibrating the breadth of 
copyright protection may have to confront the difficult task of balancing the welfare 
gains on the access side of the tradeoff against the welfare losses on the incentives side of 
the tradeoff.11  
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 Interactions among the different aspects of copyright protection 
 
The differentiated products approach thus provides a framework that is able to distinguish 
among three different ways in which copyright protection can be strengthened or 
weakened. Although this degree of nuance enriches the power of the analysis, it also 
makes copyright policy considerably more difficult to implement.  
 One problem is that the available policy instruments are not completely 
independent. Changes in the legal regime designed to calibrate the size of the right may 
also have an impact on the right’s intensity or breadth. The overlapping nature of these 
considerations complicates isolating the impact of any particular aspect of copyright 
policy.  
 It nevertheless may be possible to simplify the analysis with respect to particular 
industries or categories of copyrighted works. If one aspect of copyright protection can be 
taken as fixed with respect to certain types of works, the problem that must be solved 
becomes much simpler. Empirical studies may provide additional insights into how to 
balance these countervailing considerations. Some empirical studies suggest that any 
welfare losses resulting from excessive entry are likely to be relatively small (Yarrow, 
1985; Goettler & Shachar, 2001). Another empirical study of entry patterns in the radio 
industry estimates that the deadweight losses attributable to excess entry may be 
substantial (Berry & Waldfogel, 1999). The latter study acknowledges, however, that the 
radio industry is somewhat unusual in that it serves two different groups of customers—
advertisers and listeners—only one of which (advertisers) is able to make direct payments 
for programming. What appears to be excessive entry when measured solely in terms of 
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benefits to advertisers may in fact be efficient when measured in terms of both advertisers 
and listeners.12  
 These studies suggest the possibility of isolating the impact of each of the three 
factors identified by the differentiated products approach. Even if the empirical problem 
proves intractable, the differentiated products approach should still provide useful 
intuitions about the way these factors interact. It suggests, for example, that excess entry 
is least likely to be a problem when a work has few substitutes. Thus, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, it is when a work is the most unique that the case for strengthening 





In the final analysis, product differentiation offers significant promise as a way to 
reconceptualize the economic analysis of copyright law. What emerges is an approach 
that demonstrates how stimulating entry can promote both access and incentives 
simultaneously. This stands in stark contrast to the position that dominates existing 
copyright scholarship, which views these two considerations as being in inexorable 
tension. 
 The differentiated products approach also suggests that the best policy response to 
a highly concentrated market might well be to strengthen the degree of copyright 
protection in order to stimulate new entry. There is some irony in the fact that copyright 
protection might tend to be the strongest when high fixed costs and the low degree of 
substitutability cause the market to become the most concentrated, but this apparent 
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paradox is resolved once one understands the complex manner in which access and 
incentives interact with one another. In this sense, the differentiated products approach to 
copyright captures the insights of classic property theory, which emphasizes the 
importance that well-defined property rights can play in ensuring optimal investment and 
deployment. In so doing, it corrects for the blind spot that results when markets for 
copyrighted works are treated as monopolies, which prevents serious consideration of the 
role that short-run profits can play in stimulating entry and in promoting economic 
efficiency. At the same time, the differentiated products approach incorporates the 
possibility of excess investment and entry stimulated by demand diversion.  
 Although the theoretical implications of this analysis are clear, considerable 
additional work remains to be done before it can be fully operationalized. As noted 
earlier, further work should incorporate elements of sequential innovation that take into 
account the extent to which current works serve as inputs to subsequent works, although, 
for reasons set forth in the margin, such considerations are unlikely to prove 
problematic.13  
 Future work should also consider the implications of relaxing the symmetry 
assumption, either by applying models that allow the extent to which particular works 
serve as substitutes for other works to vary (Kaldor, 1935; Waterson, 1990). This 
suggests that copyright might profitably be analyzed by using the spatial competition 
models pioneered by Hotelling (1929), in which works compete by adopting locations 
across a characteristics space (Yoo, 2004). Relaxing the symmetry assumption allows for 
the possibility that entry by a new work will impact only some of the works rather than 
being spread evenly across all of the incumbents. This localization of competition has the 
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effect of dividing the relevant market into subsegments, with the overall competitiveness 
of the subsegment determined by the size of the total surplus of the subsegment relative 
to the fixed cost, rather than the size of the total surplus of the entire market relative to 
the fixed cost. The lack of robust competition within a subsegment may limit the extent to 
which entry can push price towards marginal cost. It can also allow the ‘integer problem’ 
to arise simultaneously with respect to multiple portions of the overall market, as the 
single ‘large economy’ is chopped into a series of ‘small economies’ that are each 
capable of supporting sustainable profits. If these effects arise with respect to multiple 
subsegments, these adverse effects may be quite substantial (Eaton & Lipsey, 1976). 
Relaxing the assumption that works will distribute themselves evenly across the product 
space creates the possibility that first movers will employ preemptive strategies to lock in 
sustainable supracompetitive positions (Baumol, 1967; Hay, 1976; Prescott & Visscher, 
1977; Eaton & Lipsey, 1980; Bonanno, 1987; Neven, 1987). The analysis becomes even 
more complex if one allows for the possibility of production of multiple works by a 
single author (Schmalensee, 1978; Eaton & Lipsey, 1979; Brander & Eaton, 1984; Judd, 
1985). 
 Finally, the policy instruments that follow from the differentiated products 
approach are by their nature extremely contextual and do not lend themselves to simple 
policy inferences. In addition, the interrelationships among the available policy 
instruments make calibrating them simultaneously an extremely difficult empirical 
exercise. The fact that the differentiated products approach is contextual and nuanced 
should not obscure its basic analytical power and does not by itself justify rejecting the 
theory. Indeed, the intuitions that the theory reveals about the relationship between access 
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and efficiency and the manner in which the various aspects of copyright protection 
interrelate are sufficient justify further inquiry.  
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2 Another submission to this volume employs a differentiated products model to 
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3 The differentiated products approach can thus be understood as striking a middle 
ground between the traditional analysis of increased copyright protection and the 
nonprotection of copyrighted works. The possibility of entry suggests that the tradeoff 
between access and incentives is not as direct as suggested by the traditional approach. 
Furthermore, the differentiated products approach also redresses the central problem with 
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nonprotection, which can provide efficient access, but which struggles to provide 
sufficient incentives to support production of creative works. This conclusion is subject 
to an important caveat discussed below. When fixed costs are large compared to marginal 
costs, it is possible that strong property rights may induce levels of entry that are 
excessive.  
4 Chamberlin’s original formulation also made a number of other simplifying 
assumptions, none of which turn out to be central to the analysis. For example, 
Chamberlin posited that each producer faced identical cost and demand curves. This 
allowed him to employ a single graph portraying the price-quantity response of a 
representative firm to model the entire market. Allowing the cost and demand curves to 
vary across products would simply cause equilibrium price and quantity to differ with 
respect to each firm, which is completely reasonable given the assumption that each 
product is differentiated. Firm-to-firm variations in price and quantity would not, 
however, change any essential aspects of the equilibrium (Kaldor, 1935; Archibald, 
1961). 
5 There is, however, a well-known exception to Chamberlin’s zero-profit result. It 
has long been recognized that the lumpiness of fixed costs may create a situation in 
which n works might earn small profits while n +1 works would run losses. This so-
called ‘integer problem’ allows for an equilibrium in which n works each earn sustainable 
profits. In large economies (i.e., when n is relatively large), such profits will be 
negligible. This integer problem was first identified by Kaldor (1935). 
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6 This conclusion depends on the convexity of consumer preferences and 
production sets (Hart 1980; Roberts 1980).  
7 Because firms must cover their fixed costs, price will not completely converge to 
marginal cost. 
8 Acknowledging how short-run profits stimulate entry should not be confused with 
Schumpeterian competition, in which competitors use innovation to obtain long-run 
competitive advantage. The ease of entry dictates that any profits should be transient 
rather than sustainable. This implies that there will be horizontal competition within the 
market rather than vertical competition for the market. Short-run profits instead stimulate 
entry in the same manner as occurs in perfectly competitive markets that are temporary 
disequilibrium. 
9 Subject to an important consideration discussed in the following section. 
10 Other analyses use different terminology to describe the same effect (Beath & 
Katsoulacos, 1991, p. 57 (‘cannibalisation’); Mankiw & Whinston, 1986 (‘business 
stealing effect’)).  
11 To give another example, substitutability also affects the proportion of surplus 
that an author can capture in another way. Monopolistic competition theory indicates that 
works with relatively steep inverse demand functions capture a lower proportion of the 
available surplus than do works with relatively flat inverse demand functions. Works 
with steep inverse demand functions tend to be products with low own-price elasticities 
of demand, which in turn tend to be those that have the fewest substitutes (Spence, 
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1976a; Spence & Owen, 1977). For a more complete discussion, see Yoo (2004, pp. 273-
74). 
12 In addition, the fact that their study assumed that the radio market is composed of 
homogeneous products led them to overlook potential welfare benefits resulting from 
product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature suggests that this simplifying 
assumption can have a fairly dramatic effect on the welfare implications (Mankiw & 
Whinston, 1986). 
13 Just as stimulating entry by close substitutes should promote access to readers by 
using increased competition to lower price, it should also promote access to follow-on 
authors who seek to build on prior work. Once the market for the work becomes 
sufficiently competitive, the problem of cumulative innovation, in which a copyrighted 
work simultaneously is licensed simultaneously to both consumers and to other authors 
who seek to use the work as an input in creating other works, becomes analogous to the 
classic problem of transfer pricing, in which a particular good simultaneously serves as 
an end product and as an input used in making another product. The transfer pricing 
literature indicates that welfare is maximized when the price of the good when used as an 
input is set equal to the price charged of the good when sold as a final product, so long as 
the final product market is sufficiently competitive (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, pp. 79-
83). Thus, so long as the total surplus in the market is sufficiently large relative to the 
fixed costs of entry, there is nothing inefficient about charging the market price to follow-
on authors who seek access to a copyrighted work as an input in creating other works. 
Should the market for the works not be sufficiently competitive, the differentiated 
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products approach suggests that the problem might be redressed by making the market 
more competitive by stimulating entry rather than by lowering the price paid by follow-
on authors. It is true that holdout behavior may prevent particular authors from creating 
particular works. Competition policy, however, focuses on protecting competition, not 
particular competitors. Thus, unless such refusals create losses for more than just 
particular individuals, no intervention is warranted. And even if intervention were 
justified, it would take the form of a targeted remedy and not a general revision of the 
scope of copyright protection.  
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